# GitBook Said Do Nothing. Then It Said Rotate.

> GitBook says an attacker reached infrastructure credentials at 19:00 CET on 2 November. The status update at 12:15 UTC on 3 November told customers to do nothing yet. A later page, stamped 16:21 CET, says personal API tokens were revoked and tells customers to rotate third-party secrets and re-authenticate MCP. The support email's data list does not match that page.

Source: https://hackerlogs.com/blog/gitbook-token-rotate-clock/
Published: 2026-11-03

## Key takeaways

- The access line is 19:00 CET on 2 November, which converts to 18:00 UTC. The page prints no seconds. The first status object is 2026-11-03T05:16:51.094Z, 11h 16m 51.094s later.
- At 2026-11-03T12:15:37.273Z the status page says you do not need to do anything right now. The marketing line for that prose is 13:15 cet.
- The 16:21 CET page names integrations tokens, Git Sync secrets, API tokens, and Assistant questions. It says personal API tokens were revoked. Third-party secrets are a customer rotation.
- The Hacker News paste lists Git Sync secrets, GitBook API tokens, and third-party API tokens. It does not say integrations tokens. Do not collapse the two lists.
- The status incident's latest update, 2026-11-03T14:58:12.662Z, does not name tokens or MCP. write_up_url is undefined.

GitBook says an attacker gained unauthorized access to some infrastructure credentials at 19:00 CET on 2 November. The customer rotate list is not on that minute. It is on a page stamped 16:21 CET on 3 November. Hacker News item [50354336](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50354336), "Gitbook Breached," was created at 2026-11-03T16:45:49Z and was on the front page. US trends at 22:42 UTC were an election slate and Manchester United. The X news tab returned HTTP 200 and a shell titled "X - The Everything App / X," with no news list in the HTML.

 High because the page says every customer's API tokens were invalidated, and because four categories of secrets and questions may have been accessed. There is no CVSS on this incident. There is no customer count.

<img src="/gitbook-token-rotate-clock.svg" alt="Three panels for the GitBook token clock: access at 19:00 CET, a later note that said do nothing, and a 16:21 CET page that says rotate and re-authenticate MCP." width="1200" height="675" />

## The disclosure clock and the impact clock.

The primary is [GitBook's incident page](https://www.gitbook.com/status/security-incident-2026-11-03). The visible stamp on the later note is "Tue, Nov 3, 2026, 16:21 CET". A component name on that same node says "16:21 PM". Do not add twelve hours. 16:21 CET is 15:21 UTC, and the line has no seconds. CET on 2 and 3 November 2026 is UTC+1. The access line "19:00 CET, November 2" converts to 18:00 UTC. That conversion is the printed minute, not a measured second.

The page says the attacker used AI agents. It does not name a model, a harness, a CVE, or a package. It says detection was immediate, the app and authenticated docs sites were taken offline, and publicly published content stayed up on cached data. It says GitBook blocked the attacker, closed the vulnerabilities involved, replaced every credential and secret across its infrastructure, and invalidated every customer's API tokens. It does not say when each of those steps finished.

[The status incident](https://www.gitbookstatus.com/incidents/01M6FXDDGQRWHMYYWXY2REQ46X) is a different clock. Name: "Security incident impacting published sites and GitBook app." Four updates, all with published_at:

| Mark | Clock |
| --- | --- |
| Access line, marketing page | 19:00 CET, 2 November. Converts to 18:00 UTC. No seconds |
| Investigating | 2026-11-03T05:16:51.094Z. Downtime on published sites and the editor. 11h 16m 51.094s after 18:00 UTC |
| Full outage window | GitBook App and Public Content, start 2026-11-03T05:16:51.094Z, end 2026-11-03T12:32:21.423Z. 7h 15m 30.329s |
| Monitoring, no action yet | 2026-11-03T12:15:37.273Z |
| Monitoring, services online | 2026-11-03T12:32:21.423Z. 16m 44.150s later |
| Monitoring, still degraded | 2026-11-03T14:58:12.662Z |
| Rotate note, marketing page | 16:21 CET, 3 November. Converts to 15:21 UTC. No seconds |
| Hacker News item | 2026-11-03T16:45:49Z. 137 points on this read |

From the converted access minute to the converted rotate minute is 21h 21m. Both ends lack seconds, so that gap is not a measured second. The status object's write_up_url is undefined. The marketing page says a full postmortem will be published soon.

The Atom feed also has a resolved entry titled "Git Sync causing missing page content," published 2026-11-02T19:09:51.616Z. Its body says a build change was rolled back. It does not say unauthorized access. A second resolved entry, "GitBook services unavailable," is stamped 2026-11-03T04:52:00.000Z and says monitoring continues on the security incident. The `.000Z` is the feed's stamp. Do not fold either title into the token list.

## The 13:15 line is not the instruction.

> The 12:15 UTC update says you do not need to do anything right now. The 14:58 UTC update still does not name a token or MCP. The rotate list is the 16:21 CET page.

The marketing page prints the earlier note as "Tue, Nov 3, 2026, 13:15 cet". A component name on that node says "13:15 PM". 13:15 CET converts to 12:15 UTC. The status update at 2026-11-03T12:15:37.273Z uses the same instruction: investigation still in progress, no confirmation yet of whether customer data was affected, you do not need to do anything right now, steps will be shared after services are restored. This read did not find a field that says the marketing line was generated from that published_at. The prose matches. The marketing line has no seconds.

That update also says unauthorized access to parts of GitBook's infrastructure, contained quickly, some services taken offline. It does not say AI agents. The AI-agent sentence is on the 16:21 CET page.

The 12:32:21.423Z update says both the GitBook App and public content should be online, and that monitoring continues. The 14:58:12.662Z update says some specific issues still affect some customers' published sites, a few services may still be degraded, and monitoring continues. Incident status on that read is Monitoring. The homepage banner said the incident had been ongoing for 17 hours. That duration is a render, not a start minute.

## The email list is not the page list.

The 16:21 CET page says the attacker may have accessed integrations tokens, Git Sync secrets, API tokens, and questions asked to GitBook Assistant by site visitors. It says there is no evidence that content in GitBook was modified. The action block says rotate any existing GitBook API tokens, and that all personal API tokens were revoked during the incident. It says rotate third-party API tokens or secrets used to connect other tools, rotate secrets in published integrations, and re-authenticate the GitBook MCP server.

The Hacker News item is a support-email paste. The poster wrote that they had not yet seen an official customer communication. The paste's data block says Git Sync secrets, GitBook API tokens, third-party API tokens used to connect external tools, and the same Assistant questions. It does not say "Integrations tokens." Its action block matches the page: personal API tokens revoked, third-party rotation, published-integration secrets, MCP re-authentication. Quote the list on the page you opened. Do not average them into one inventory.

Google News in the two-day window carried a Decrypt item on this incident. That feed pubDate is Tue, 03 Nov 2026 19:46:03 GMT. This brief does not use the rewrite.

## What to do with the tokens.

1. Treat personal GitBook API tokens as revoked on GitBook's side. The page says they were revoked during the incident. Replace any job that still holds one. The rotate line is broader than the personal-token sentence: it says rotate any existing GitBook API tokens.
2. Rotate third-party API tokens and secrets that connect other tools to GitBook, and rotate secrets in published integrations. A GitBook-side revoke does not expire a secret at the other issuer. Git Sync secrets are in the "may have accessed" list. Rotate those at the Git host.
3. Re-authenticate the GitBook MCP server. The page names that step on its own. It does not name a server version.
4. Do not brief a model, a CVE, or a customer count from this page. None of the three is on it. The vulnerabilities it says were closed are unnamed.
5. Do not read the 12:15 UTC status update as the current instruction. That sentence said no action yet. The 16:21 CET page is the customer action. The postmortem is still ahead, and write_up_url on the incident object is undefined.

The package clock is empty. There is no release to upgrade. The impact clock is the token that GitBook cannot revoke: a third-party secret, a Git Sync secret, and an MCP session that still presents the old credential.

## Sources

- [Security incident](https://www.gitbook.com/status/security-incident-2026-11-03) (2026-11-03)
- [Security incident impacting published sites and GitBook app](https://www.gitbookstatus.com/incidents/01M6FXDDGQRWHMYYWXY2REQ46X) (2026-11-03)
- [Gitbook Breached](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50354336) (2026-11-03)
